The policy winds evidently shifted during the 1990s, and both PSYOP and civil affairs units faced reductions in numbers and capabilities. Despite Congressional interest in PSYOP, Defense Department strategists placed a greater premium on firepower than on brainpower Colonel Curris warns of the error of deemphasizing brainpower at a time when milita

During the 1970s and 1980s, the Defense Department expanded the role of psychological operations primarily with the former Soviet Union in mind. As Colonel Curris notes, “This strategy included establishing specialized units, developing cutting-edge technologies, and creating sophisticated methodologies for influencing target audiences.”[12] Ps

had this observation: “A crucial yet underutilized tool in the U.S. strategic arsenal can help counter the multifaceted threats sophisticated adversaries pose: military information support operations, or MISO, carried out by psychological operations forces. In layman’s terms, MISO is designed to develop and convey messages and devise actions to